A security boundary must be deterministic, enforced, and fail closed. A permission check either passes or it does not, regardless of how persuasive the request is. Alignment is none of those things.
Safety training shifts the probability distribution of model outputs toward refusing harmful requests. The refusal is a learned behavior that adversarial inputs can and regularly do overcome.
New jailbreak techniques are published continuously, and each model release resets the cat-and-mouse game.
There are structural reasons it cannot be airtight. The model cannot verify who is speaking; any text claiming authority might be an attacker.
The engineering implication: treat model refusals as a valuable defense-in-depth layer and a UX safeguard. Place actual security controls in deterministic systems around the model.
A useful rule: the model can be socially engineered, so never give it authority you would not give a well-meaning but gullible intern.
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